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Nowadays mainstream economic textbooks maintain that economic laws can be 
established solely on the foundations of the exact sciences, such as mathematics or 
physics. The implication is that the historical date collected with the aid of statistics and 
other technical means can be used to scientifically unveil, explain, and predict 
mankind’s behavior. Although economics today embodies individual tastes in the form 
of elegant charts that are depicted in text books as ‘indifference curves’, it has not gone 
further in characterizing the all important motivations, influences, or feelings of the 
acting individuals.  If the sole purpose of economic research is to analyze the properties 
of general equilibrium in the conditions of perfect knowledge and perfect competition, 
this may well suffice. It  seems as if all approaches to economic phenomena which do 
not follow this doctrine are quickly branded unscientific and repudiated. Rather than 
constructing a system of timeless general equilibrium prices, as is the goal of the 
mathematically oriented schools of thought, in our world of scarcity, lack or dispersion 
of knowledge, and ever changing degrees of expectations, the Austrians attempt to 
explain the forces and causes that stand behind the price formation. The two main 
pillars of the Austrian school of economics are methodological individualism (a term 
used by J.A. Schumpeter) and methodological subjectivism. This approach to economic 
phenomena builds scientific analysis upon the insight that every individual chooses and 
acts purposively and in accordance with his perception of the expected actions of 
others. In observing the actions of others we are aided by our ability to “understand” the 
meaning of such actions because we are human beings and thus have insights into the 
behavior of our fellow men.  
 
 
*This paper was written while in residence at ICER (Torino, Italy), one of the most 
productive, best organized, and truly congenial research centers I know.  I would like 
to express my sincere gratitude to ICER’s director, Prof. Enrico Colombatto for 
providing not only a splendid academic environment, personal cordiality, and generous 
support, but also for countless encouraging and very helpful comments.  I also like to 
thank ICER’s secretary, Alessandra Calosso for her tireless efforts and her 
inexhaustible patience, and Saverio Iacomussi for his help.   1
Introduction 
 
"Since Ricardo's Principles there has been no other book not even excepting Jevons' 
brilliant but somewhat aphoristic and Walras' unfortunately difficult work - which has 
had such a great influence on the development of economics as Menger's Principles”.1 
 
In 1921 when Knut Wicksell wrote these lines about Carl Menger’s first book, 
the Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre (1871), he was quite accurate. Despite the 
fact that the portrayal of 'Austrian' thought in the pertinent German methodological 
discussion had acquired something of a pejorative undertone2, the influence of some of 
the core theses of the Austrian School of Economics in particular in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, in Italy, Scandinavia, England, and even the United States was hard 
to miss3. Already by the 1890s, the regard of economics as having nearer affinity with 
psychology than with mathematics and their sparing in the use of elegant models and 
graphical illustrations was set out to become widely acclaimed. The deductive methods 
used by the Austrians steadily gained attractiveness.  
The success of the Austrian School between 1880 and 1930 was certainly 
neither only the work of Menger as its founder, nor of his indirect students Eugen von 
Böhm-Bawerk and his brother–in-law, Friedrich von Wieser, who were able to advance 
Austrian economics almost to the status of a mainstream school of thought. For them 
and the cohort of Menger’s direct and immediate students by the turn of the century, 
Austrian Economics was not a field within economics but an alternative way of looking 
                                                 
 
1 K. Wicksell, Selected Papers on Economic Theory, ed. E. Lindahl, Kelley Reprint, New York, 1969, p. 
194. 
2 Among countless other works,see Werner Sombart, Die Drei Nationalökonomien, Dunker und 
Humboldt, München und Leipzig, 1930. Mention should be made here that Sombart, by far the most 
dedicated of Gustav von Schmoller’s students, succeeded to radically change his methodological and 
political positions at least three times, always according to the prevailing Zeitgeist. Also G. von 
Schmoller, "Zur Methodologie der Staats und Sozialwissenchaften," in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, VII, 3, 
1883; or T. W. Hutchinson, A Review of Economic Doctrines, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962 are of 
interest here 
3 See, for example, H.R. Seager, "Economics at Berlin and Vienna," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
1, 1893, pp. 236-262; and Jacob Viner, "The Utility Concept in Value Theory and its Critics, " Journal of 
Political Economics, Vol. 33, 1925.   2
  at the entire domain of the social sciences.  To no minor account Eugen von 
Phillippovich's important, three volume text book Grundriss der Politischen Ökonomie 
(1893) also contributed very successfully to the spreading of Austrian ideas and was in 
1920 already in its 15
th edition. According to Hayek this much-read text was 
affectionately called “Grupolök” by many of his fellow students.  
By the middle of the 1930s, however due to the politically volatile times, an 
increasing racist bias, and with not much hope for any decent academic position, most 
of the school’s proponents have already left Austria as a matter of survival. Some were 
compelled to collaborate with the new political system, others had to take what ever 
inferior jobs there were, and a few of them committed suicide or perished during the 
Nazi regime. And when Hans Mayer, the editor of the “Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie” in 1938 proudly welcomed “das weltgeschichtliche Ereignis der 
von allen Deutschen Österreichs seit Jahrhunderten erstrebten Wiedervereinigung der 
Ostmark mit dem grossen Deutschen Reich und damit auch der Wiederherstellung des 
dem einheitlichen kulturellen Leben des deutschen Volkes allein entsprechenden 
natürlichen Zustandes”4, the school lost even its highly reputed theoretical organ. With 
Mises and Haberler in Geneva, Hayek and Rosenstein-Rodan in London, Machlup in 
Buffalo (NY), Schönfeldt-Illy in hiding, and many others dispersed all over the world, 
Vienna ceased to exist as the stronghold for Austrian economics. Furthermore, due to 
the overwhelming acceptance of the “Keynesian Revolution”, the Austrian insights 
have been pushed to the sidelines of economic and political thinking. The firm non-
interventionist position of the Austrian school simply could not compete with the 
politically much more appealing ideas of “under-consumption”, “full employment”, and 
“deficit spending”. The attractiveness of the new Keynesianism ensured that it 
dominated most textbooks and of course policy making for something like a quarter of 
a century after WW II. The problems of varying individual information, uncertainty and 
lack of knowledge towards which F.A. von Hayek was devoting much of his efforts in 
 
                                                 
4 See Hans Mayer, “Editorial”, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, vol. IX, 9, Aug, 19, 1938   3
his study of the price system in the subjectivist Austrian tradition were not deemed 
either critical for society nor useful for the career advancement  of economists. 
Although, never completely dormant, this condition more or less prevails until 
today. The Austrian School of Economics regretfully is still widely perceived as either 
unscientific, mostly because of its rejection of mathematical methods and techniques. 
Or at least it is viewed as not much more than a topic studied by historians of economic 
thought who are specializing in the development of economic theory in the second half 
of the 19
th century. At many places the protagonists of the school are even regarded as 
aggressive ideologues of extreme free markets or worse, as members of a somewhat 
distant, anarchical sect. They may encounter outright opposition when it comes to 
academic hiring, promotions, or the placement of an article in one of the leading 
professional journals. It is here where most Austrian minded scholars are forced to 
make concessions and often engage in the questionable strategy of writing mainstream 
articles that may well get published in reputed periodicals but at the same time do little 
to advance the Austrian cause. And yet, faced with the apparent break-down of the 
welfare state and the failing of Keynesian strategies, the Austrian approach to economic 
phenomena seems to enjoy at last a modest resurgence at several universities and 




Why is it that in many articles and text books we still find Carl Menger, the 
founder of the Austrian School portrayed simply as one of those intellectual pioneers, 
who only attempted to solve some important problems of the classical period and to 
reconstruct economic theory as a holistic doctrine, based on a single system of logical 
principles?  5  One almost could get the impression that in order to lay down the 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, W. Lexis , Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre, 3.ed, Teubner, Berlin und Leipzig, 
1926, or more recent, Martin C. Spechler, Perspectives in Economic Thought, McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1990; and A. Brusatti, Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte des Industriellen Zeitalters, Styria, Graz, 1967; 
and Robin P. Malloy, Law and Economics, West Publishers, St. Paul, MN, 1990; and M. Blaug, 
Economic Theory in Retrospect, Heineman, London, 1973. The list could be continued.   4
foundations of the school, Menger only needed to have a creative mind, the ability to 
build his ideas on the established theoretical concept of the classical school, and to be 
equipped with an appropriate dose of academic elbow grease and connections. This 
gross oversimplification certainly is not accurate as the Austrian School did not develop 
simply because Menger supplied these conditions.  
It seems as if hardly anyone so far has taken the effort of systematically linking 
value theory before 1871 to the development of marginal utility. After all, the works of 
the Italians, such as Lottini, Davanzati, or Galiani and for that matter also the German 
Herrman H. Gossen, obviously contributed to the revolutionary breakthrough of the 
1870s. It was Gian Francesco Lottini (1512 - 1572) who had already a rough idea of the 
fact that people value goods that are presently available much more than those available 
in the future, and, thus he more or less created the fundamentally important theory of 
time preference which later came to be associated with Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s 
work. But also Bernardo Davanzati (1529 - 1606) reflected on subjective value and 
attempted to solve the famous 'paradox of value.' However, probably more than Lottini 
and Davanzati,  it was Ferdinando Galiani (1728 - 1787) who contributed most 
effectively to the ultimate development of the modern theories of utility and value, 
ideas which are closely associated with the ‘Austrians’. Born in Chieti, Galiani wrote 
his most noted book Della Moneta (1750) when he was only in his early twenties. This 
book contains his seminal contributions to the theory of subjective value and his interest 
theory. Galiani was also quite aware of the ranking of goods, substitution of goods, and 
diminishing marginal utility, topics which formed the core of Menger’s thinking about 
one hundred years later. Mention should also be made of the work by Francesco Ferrara 
(1810-1900), another Italian thinker who expanded on subjectivism.6  
 
                                                 
6 See James M. Buchanan, Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1960. Francesco Ferrara (1810-1900) was teaching  in Turin because he was exiled from 
the Kingdom of the two Sicily.   5
H. H. Gossen’s visionary and famous Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen 
Verkehrs is even hardly mentioned.7  Similarly, the cogent role of the specifically 
'causal-genetic' approach on the development of Middle-European culture8 is rarely 
mentioned, let alone systematically analyzed. The approach of the 18th century 
Austrian students of public finance, the “Kameralisten” was also quite influential to the 
thinking of the imperial bureaucracy during the time Menger began to work on his first 
book.9 It is especially the general view of society that to an extent forecasts the 




Among the three eminent scholars who in the 1870s accomplished a strong 
renewal of interest in theory, the Austrian Carl Menger was surely in the most 
unfavorable position.  While on the one hand Leon Walras of Laussanne had only been 
able to address a small selected group of like-minded people due to his exceedingly 
complicated work and mathematical expositions. The work produced by William 
Stanley Jevons of England on the other hand was essentially received with passive 
indifference. But Carl Menger, in this setting not only had to fight resistance in his own 
country, but also faced an active and aggressive opposition in and from the German 
Reich. 
                                                 
7 For an appropriate understanding of the influence, these precursors of the theory of subjective value 
had on Menger, refer to the interesting comments and annotations to Menger's first book which is 
preserved in Tokyo's Hitotsubashi University since 1961. See also, Carl Menger's first draft of his 
principle work, compiled by Karl Heinrich Rau in 1963 and also preserved in Tokyo's Hitotsubashi 
University.  
8 The term 'causal-genetic' is used by the Austrian School to refer to the holistic interdependencies of 
orders. In this sense, orders are simply reactions to purposeful actions. Thus, all human action is a priori 
and the reactions are the outcomes. As such, all action is linked in a causal-genetic relationship between 
observed action and subjective interpretation. 
9 See especially the detailed study by Louise Sommers, Die österreichischen Kameralisten, Wien 
1920-25   6
For several reasons his revolutionary Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre, published 
in Vienna in 1871 was not given due attention10.  
 
On the one hand, virtually all universities of the German Reich were dominated 
by the then omnipresent “Younger German Historical School”.  The school’s conscious 
rejection of all theoretical issues and approaches emerged as soon as this group was 
united under Gustav von Schmoller’s mostly undisputed leadership. G. von Schmoller 
believed theoretical analysis to be useless or at best of minor importance since it is 
applicable only to artificially isolated fragments of the social reality he wanted to 
perceive in all its many facets. Unlike the older German historical school and despite 
the fact that Schmoller publicly disparaged Comte’s positivism (perhaps mostly on 
grounds of its atheism and its French origin), this group of scholars was predominantly 
guided by the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte11. Following this historicistic 
train of thought history thus is widely interpreted as an empirical study of society from 
which ultimate generalization would eventually emerge and through the discovery of 
some “laws of history” we can finally get the key to true historical understanding. This 
historicism is eventually leading to a predetermined end, and therefore history can be 
interpreted teleologically as a succession of achieved purposes. This peculiar 
“understanding” is accomplished through the collection of historical data and serves as 
the only legitimate method. The history of science shows that research is confined to 
the ordering of quantitative relationships. Auguste Comte’s influential key 
methodological position briefly speaking had it that social wholes are better known than 
the elements of which they consist and social theory, therefore ought to start from our 
knowledge of the directly apprehended wholes. Since Comte went even so far as to 
                                                 
10 Although four professional journal existed in the German Reich at that time, only three of them 
published short reviews, but mostly missing the central ideas of the book. One exception could  perhaps 
be made for N. Hack who at least appreciated its scholarship, see “Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft”, xxvii, 1872. For an almost exhaustive record of these book reviews, see R.S. 
Howey’s The Rise of the Marginal Utility School 1870-1889, University of Kansas Press 1960. 
11 See especially Fritz Raab, Die Fortschrittsidee bei Gustav von Schmoller, Freiburg/Br. 1934; but also 
of interest here is Hans Wäntig, Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der 
Sozialwissenschaft, Stuttgart 1984; or W. Eucken, “Die Überwindung des Historizismus”, Schmoller’s 
Jahrbuch, LXII 1938   7
claim that only the society as a whole is real and that the individual is only an 
abstraction, his followers turned toward what they believed to be a biological and 
organic interpretation of social phenomena. From intuitively apprehended abstract 
concepts of society or civilization he deducted from it his knowledge of the structure of 
society. Hence, the social sciences must be treated as social physics, shaped according 
to the epistemological patterns of Newtonian mechanics. Thus economics, probably 
more than most of the other social sciences is prone to accept the prevailing tendency of 
using terms that are borrowed from physics or mathematics in order to describe social 
phenomena. 
It seems useful to recall here that “understanding” for the Austrians is in sharp 
contrast to these ideas a method for the interpretation of typical courses of actions with 
the help of a so-called thought design12. In the theoretical cultural sciences the 
significance of typical courses of action is interpreted with the aid of “thought design”, 
such as the logic of choice. This approach is fully justified by the fact that all human 
action is oriented to individual plans. It was the Austrian school that has gradually 
developed “verstehen” as a method within the theoretical social sciences. For the 
Austrians the thought design, the economic calculation of an individual’s plan, always 
is viewed as the most important part of the theoretical interest. This statement does not 
diminish the significance of the concepts of methodological subjectivism and marginal 
utility.  
 
  On the other hand, the administration of the public universities, and hence the 
direction of research and teaching in the German Reich was systematically controlled 
by Friedrich Althoff, a political ally and friend of Schmollers13. This guiding 
supervision of scholarly work developed into the so-called “System Althoff” and 
                                                 
12 See Kurt R. Leube, “Begreifen and Verstehen” , An Austrian in France. Festschrift in Honor of 
Jacques Garello, K.R. Leube, A. Petroni, and J.Sadovsky, eds. Turin, La Rosa 1997. 
13 Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908) was one of Germany’s three most influential administrators of science 
between W. von Humboldt (1767-1835) and C.H. Becker (1886-1933). He dominated higher education 
from 1882-1907 and systematically manipulated and controlled all professional appointments. See 
Bernhard vom Brocke, “Von der Wissenschaftsverwaltung zur Wissenschafts- politk. Friedrich Althoff 
1839-1908”. Berichte der Wissenschaftsgeschichte 11, Marburg 1988.   8
severely interfered not only with the ideal of academic freedom, but unlike in the 
natural sciences proved especially problematic with regard to the social sciences. 
According to L.von Mises “one of the most eminent German scientists, Emil du Bois-
Reymond, boasted that the University of Berlin was ‘the intellectual bodyguard of the 
House of Hohenzollern’”14. Thus, formally well into the last century it was virtually 
impossible for a scholar devoted to the Austrian tradition to attain a professorship at 
any decent German university15.  
One additional hurdle was of course that Menger’s book was quickly out of 
print and quite difficult to obtain. It should not surprise then that under these 
circumstances, Menger's "anti-classical" work did not become particularly well known. 
However, this state of affairs lasted only until Menger's second book, his seminal 
Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen 
Ökonomie insbesondere (1883) was published. This work must be regarded as the 
opening blast for the famous “Methodenstreit” between the Schmoller school and 
Menger and many of his loyal students. This heated academic conflict  was 
passionately, but not always tactfully fought by both sides, and was eventually won by 
the Austrians. According to Ludwig von Mises, the frequently used term 
“Methodenstreit” is truly distorting.  For Mises, “the issue was not to discover the most 
appropriate procedure for the treatment of the problems commonly considered as 
economic problems. The matter in dispute was essentially whether there could be such 
a thing as a science, other than history, dealing with aspects of human action.”16 
However, all things considered almost gloatingly one might add here that this 
bitter academic controversy which involved most of the leading scholars of the time, 
                                                 
14 L.v. Mises, The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics, Arlington House, New York, 
1969 
15 Since Schumpeter’s methodological position followed naturally from his view that Walras’ 
accomplishments represented the true height of economic thought he cannot be counted as a ‘pure’ 
Austrian. The appointment of F.A. von Hayek at the University of Freiburg/Br. to succeed Walter Eucken 
in 1962  must therefore  be regarded as the sole exception  to date.   
16 See Ludwig von Mises, The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics, Arlington House, 
New York, 1969   9
did much to make the Austrian approach well known and can be seen as an example of 




Menger’s book Grundsätze has played a decisive role in the course of the 
history of economic thought and even after 131 years offers an inexhaustible wealth of 
pathbreaking insights and a distinctive vision of economics as a science. Suffice it to 
summarize here some of his most important points. Carl Menger started his elaboration 
by clearly distinguishing between free and economic goods, whereby the former are 
viewed as present in excess, because the assured supply exceeds the demand. In the 
case of economic goods the supply is at least equal but mostly less than demand. It is 
obvious that only economic goods call for planning and prudence as they are scarce, 
must be used with care, and should be protected. These goods alone can establish 
private properties, only they are produced, exchanged, and finally and most 
importantly, only they can be assessed and valued. Menger also showed how the most 
marketable good becomes the medium of exchange or in the long run even turn into 
money. Carl Menger used the term “organic” as opposed to “pragmatic”, to refer to 
phenomena which were generated by “institutions which serve the common welfare and 
are extremely significant for its development [but] come into being without a common 
will directed towards establishing them”.18 A “pragmatic” phenomenon is the product 
of legislation, contract, or an agreement to a specific conscious end. In F.A. von 
Hayek’s  words such phenomena are “the result of human design”. 
                                                 
17 The direct translation of the title would be : Inquiries of the Method of Social Sciences and Political 
Economy in Particular. Nevertheless, there are two translated versions of this book. One has been entitled 
in English as Problems of Economics and Sociology, one under another title. See also, Samuel Bosthaph, 
"The Methodological Debate Between Carl Menger and the German Historicists'" Atlantic Economic 
Journal, Vol. 6, 3, 1978, pp. 3-16. Also, James Bonar, "The Austrian Economists and their View of 
Value, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, 1988, pp. 1-31; not quite as informative, George J. 
Stigler,"The Economics of Carl Menger," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 45, 2, 1937, pp. 229-250. 
18 Carl Menger, Problems of Economics and Sociology, University of Illinois Press, Chicago 1960, p. 
146   10
The three concepts, subjectivism, atomistic method, and these “organic phenomena” 
form the basis of the Austrian tradition.  
Although there is a lot to be said of the many attempts to relate the Austrian 
school of economics to the supposedly Aristotelian features of the Austrian mind, 
suffice it to say that most of these attempts seems almost like free associations19. At 
any rate, in seeking the Aristotelian essence of economic relationships, Menger looked 
for the necessary characteristics of these relationships and intended to determine laws 
that rule economic events. These principles are derived from the essential factors 
involved, and are according to Menger invariably true regardless of time and place.  At 
every step of his very detailed story, Menger emphasizes the subjective nature of the 
properties, their dependence on the individual’s knowledge of time and place, and his 
attitude towards his wants and the ability of the objects to satisfy his needs20. His 
subjectivist approach allowed Menger to carry his analysis even to the evaluation of 
capital goods which he called “goods of higher order”. Menger’s subjective revolution 
amounted to the recognition that value has never been nor will it ever be a property or a 
substance inherent in goods. The basis for property is the protection of ownership of 
economic goods. As their character can shift with changes in supply and demand, there 
is nothing inherent in goods that makes them economic or noneconomic. According to 
Menger then, a good is said to have value if economizing men perceive that the 
satisfaction of one of their needs (or greater or lesser completeness of satisfaction) 
depends on their command over the good. Utility therefore, is the capacity of a thing to 
satisfy human needs and a prerequisite of goods character.  
                                                 
19 See, among other works, especially Emil Kauder, “Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older 
Austrian School”, in Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie,vol. 17, 1957.  
20 F.A. von Hayek, “The Place of Carl Menger’s Grundsätze in the History of Economic Thought”, The 
Essence of Hayek, K.R.Leube and Chiaki Nyshiyama, Eds. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1984.   11
The central concept of Menger’s value theory, therefore is evaluation, an act of 
the intellect. The value of any good is simply the relationship between an appraising 
mind and the objects appraised. Menger thus has introduced the method of subjectivism 





Carl Menger never made any direct reference to mathematics as an useful 
research method in his published works. Nevertheless by looking at his sporadic 
correspondence with Walras and a few annotations which he scribbled into his own 
books, we can assume that he did not have a particularly strong mathematical bent. 
There is some uncertainty about the level of mathematical expertise which Menger was 
able to achieve. His only son Karl, himself a mathematician once claimed that his 
father’s strong distaste for mathematics and its methods, had its origin in  the poor, if 
not inadequate mathematical training he had received in his rural Galician 
“Gymnasium” years during the 1850s21. But even if this statement were true, his and 
later on, his followers’ methodological objections against the use of mathematics as a 
research tool must be much deeper.  
For both, Walras and Jevons, the merit or value of mathematics and the 
marginal utility concept was the power in demonstrating the conditions for an 
equilibrium in a given social environment where exchanges usually take place.  Thus 
the economic analysis derived from their works took on an essentially static quality that 
basically must be viewed as an attempt to determine the necessary prerequisites for an 
equilibrium state of affairs22. 
                                                 
21 Karl Menger, jun. made this comment at a luncheon which I have organized in the ‘Ancora Verde’ in 
Vienna in 1983 to celebrate the centenary of L.von Mises birthday. In addition to Menger, also M.St. 
Browne, G.von Haberler, F.A. von Hayek and his wife, Margit von Mises, Max Thurn, myself and my 
wife were present.  The records are in my possession. 
22 See among other works, William Jaffe, “Menger, Jevon and Walras De-Homogenized” in Economic 
Inquiry, Dec. 1976   12
It was especially Walras who emphasized that any passage of time before the 
equilibrium is achieved must undermine that very equilibrium, because all data-
changing events that might happen on the way to the equilibrium necessarily will 
contribute to determine that state of affairs. All transaction undertaken in the course of 
achieving the equilibrium thus must be invalidated. Menger’s approach on the other 
hand had in comparison essential dynamic qualities that set it apart from any other 
school of thought. For Menger an equilibrium was purely a useful limiting case that 
portrayed the circumstances under which no further motivations for exchange among 
traders would exist. The importance of marginal utility for Menger was precisely its 
value in enabling an analysis of the exchange process itself, regardless of the concrete 
manifestation of any eventual equilibrium outcome. 
 
Although the correspondence between Menger and Leon Walras consists of 
only four letters, two by each man, they should be sufficient here to show the central 
point which Menger attempted to make. This point which involved an objection to the 
use of mathematics as a tool, and in Walras’ case the most important tool, of  economic 
analysis. From his atomistic point of view Menger made it clear to Walras that “we do 
not simply study quantitative relationships but also the nature [das Wesen] of economic 
phenomena. How can we attain to the knowledge of this latter (e.g., the nature of value, 
rent, profit, the division of labor, bimetallism, etc.) by mathematical methods?”23 He 
described the task of economics to Walras as “...the tracing back of the complex 
phenomena of the economy to their true causes, to their constitutive elements, and the 
investigation of the laws according to which these build themselves up into complex 
phenomena of the economy.”24 In other words, Menger’s real objection to mathematics 
was that it simply amounted to an auxiliary tool of exposition which in no way 
enhanced the ability of the economist to deal with the most basic of the task which he 
had to face. 
                                                 
23 Leon Walras, Correspondence of Leon Walras and Related Papers, ed. William Jaffe, 2 vols. 
Amsterdam:  North Holland Publishing Co., 1965. 
24 Ibid,.   13
A few significant notes which Menger scribbled into the German translation of 
John St. Mill’s Grundsätze der politischen Ökonomie (1864) can yield even a bit  more. 
In one of them he rejected the theory of equilibrium. He argued that because Walras 
assumes that the different elements of the economic processes are interrelated they must 
be linked by static functional relations, his causal-genetic method renders incompatible 
with Walras’ position.25 Another significant, yet widely neglected source for insights 
into Menger’s position are his two essays which appeared in the Wiener Zeitung of 
March 7 and 8, 1889 26.  Here he critically reviewed several new books on economic 
topics that were published in Austria. Among them was the important work Zur Theorie 
des Preises (1889), by his outstanding direct student, Robert Zuckerkandl (1856-1926) 
and the Untersuchungen über die Theorie des Preises (1889) by Rudolf Auspitz and 
Richard Lieben. This work was praised by J.A. Schumpeter as one of “the outstanding 
contributions to mathematical economics and especially to the geometrical treatment  of 
economic problems”27. Although, the authors of this book were overall sympathetic to 
the theory of subjective value, Menger’s review of it carried a somewhat impatient tone 
(in Menger’s copy of this book we can find a few additional sketchy notes). His distinct 
methodological critique of the Auspitz and Lieben can be summarized here in three 
interrelated points. Firstly he accused the authors of the use of mathematics as a 
research tool, rather than only as a device to display or to illustrate certain phenomena. 
Secondly, he maintained that Auspitz and Lieben have not only adapted the 
“Suppositionsmethode” instead of having used a pure analytical approach. Menger also 
argued that they took their statically assumptions of an equilibrium simply as data. And 
finally, Menger wrote sarcastically that although the authors have presented their 
essentially wrong messages in a graphically correct way, they nonetheless failed to 
overcome the ultimate deficiency of their suppositions.  
 
                                                 
25 see Emil Kauder, A History of the Marginal Utility Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
1965, p. 99  and the literature there. 
26 C.Menger “Neuere nationalökonomische Literatur I /II” Wiener Zeitung, March 7 and 8, 1889. 
27 Joseph A. Schumpeter, “Auspitz, Rudolf (1837-1906)”, The International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, ed. by Sills, New York, Macmillan, 1968   14
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The application of mathematical methods in economic science is probably as old 
as the theoretical thinking about the subject, and regretfully seems to follow the popular 
‘Zeitgeist’ of intellectual trends and cultural developments. Ernest Mach’s 
characterization of the ‘equilibrium’ as the physical status that is equal to a static 
condition probably has also contributed to the widespread use of these terms28. The 
vast majority of today’s professional economists seem to believe firmly that the 
utilization of “objective” mathematics can warrant a clear and consistent methodology. 
In order to be considered truly scientific like the natural sciences, economics apparently 
must be shunned from such concepts as personal purposes, goals or even the ideas 
associated with studying or learning.  Only in the natural sciences can experiments 
allow us to verify or falsify a hypothesis and to draw conclusions from past 
experiences. Economic research is confronted with a number of uniform or 
homogenous bits of events that can be investigated for quantitative regularities and 
constants. Hypotheses are framed in order to explain classes of behavior or motions, 
and furthermore, various propositions are then deduced by which theories can be tested 
against the empirical facts of these observable uniform or homogenous bits of events. 
The theory is therefore either “verified” or “falsified” by empirical checks. If we were 
not able to investigate the dependence or independence of the elements of any natural 
phenomenon through the variation of one or more components in the experiment, then 
we probably would not be able to grasp the relations that govern nature through 
empirical laws.  But the methods used in the natural sciences must consistently also 
abandon men’s mind and in the model of positive economics, describe only mere 
events. The taxonomic approach to quantify relations between different subjects of 
investigations thus seems the task of economics.  
                                                 
28 See Ernest Mach, Die Mechanik, Wien 1883, pg. 8. On the role Mach’s ideas have played in the 
intellectual circles of fin-de-siecle Vienna, see especially F.A. von Hayek’s interesting remarks about 
“Ernest Mach und das sozialwissenschaftliche Denken in Wien”, in Ernst Mach Institut ed. Symposium 
aus Anlass des 50. Todestages von Ernst Mach, Freiburg/Br. 1967. Ernest Mach lived from 1838 til 1916.   15
Mainstream economic theory thus applies mathematical methods, mechanical 
images, and technical terms or phrases, like equilibrium or static to describe events and 
circumstances without the all important dimension of time. Whereas the role of time is 
absolutely essential for Austrian economics, equilibrium theory is meaningful only in a 
framework of timeless static. The Austrian focal point however are the transactions 
undertaken in the course of time. And yet, should it not be obvious that all human 
actions are dynamic actions that involve plans and therefore require a real time 
dimension? This cannot be resolved by splitting actions into several successive 
equilibria as these render sense only if they are used for the analysis of the actions of an 
individual.  
Human actions can only be viewed as being in an equilibrium if they are part of 
a plan. Only if all these human actions were to take place at the same time and under 
identical circumstances could we substantiate our claim about the links of which we 
reach a conclusion from our assumption of the knowledge and the subjective 
preferences of an individual’s action. All data which led to an individual’s action are in 
their totality necessarily only subjectively known by him and thus cannot be objective 
facts which are as such recognizable to all. For any social interaction or transfer to take 
place, the information on which an individual grounds his plans necessarily must 
represent the expectation that others are going to act in a certain way. Hence it is a 
necessary precondition for the compatibility of the different plans that the planned 
actions of one individual contain the data for the strategy of the other.  
Such an assumption seems highly impossible. The attempt to circumnavigate 
this serious flaw by assuming that all participating individuals possess the same pits and 
pieces of information29 at the same time does not contribute to resolve it. It is exactly 
this assumption which Menger called the “supposition-method” when he criticized the 
Untersuchungen über die Theorie des Preises (1889) by Auspitz and Lieben mentioned 
above. It is misleading to believe that all data relevant for the decision making 
                                                 
29 See F.A. von Hayek’s seminal book,  Preise und Produktion (Wien, Springer 1932/1976) where he 
treats this important subject for the first time; his “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (AER, Sep. 1945  
and reprinted in The Esence of Hayek, K.R. Leube and Ch.Nishiyama, Eds., Hoover Press, Stanford, 
1984) is probably the best known and most quoted essay on this topic.   16
processes are objectively the same for all and as such also available for all at the time of 
undertaking the ‘logic of choice’. As mentioned above, the categories of the logic of 
choice are always means and ends. The distinction between logic and factual 
knowledge is justified in the realm of nature where no meaning is instantaneously 
accessible to us and in which care must constantly be taken to distinguish between the 
individual plans and the reality. This means that every singly transaction must depend 
on the expectations of the market participants. In accepting the logic of choice we can 
only speak of data known only to the acting person. As soon as the analysis of one 
individual’s equilibrium is applied to the entire society the definition of the equilibrium 
necessarily must acquire a different meaning.  
 
We are faced with a similar dilemma when it comes to the interpretation of the 
term “data”. Obviously, by definition data are always known and a given. The decisive 
question in economics which boils down to who knows and who controls them, 
however remains unresolved and not even tackled. Is it assumed that the analyst 
studying the transaction possesses this knowledge or is it taken for granted that the 
individual whose actions are to be analyzed has this information?  This means however, 
that terms such as “price” or “data” cannot be used to identify a certain thing or a 
physical good. Instead, the “price” necessarily is a phenomenon that is defined only by 
the interactions of people and as such has no other properties as those which are 
reflected by these exchanges. From an Austrian point of view, the price theory thus 
cannot tell us anything substantial about the behavior of prices of different  goods or 
services, it can only advise us about the prices of goods or services of which the acting 
people have formed a certain opinion and about how people are going to use the goods. 
In other words prices serve only as a signal. The mainstream economist thus cannot 
explain the phenomenon of prices or why prices may change only through his own 
accumulated knowledge of the good. Only through the “understanding” and “begreifen” 
of the opinions people who are involved in the transaction have formed of the good, 
could the economist fully explain the phenomena of prices. In the social sciences all   17
objects are defined never by their specific properties, but always through the judgment 




In our world of scarcity and uncertainty the utilization of the terms of the 
mechanical sciences serves in no small part to pretend that we already possess or at 
least soon will have accumulated an exact knowledge about the social environment, 
human action, and future demands. But since we have started to construct models of 
ideal type settings, economists have been compelled to include in this scenario the 
image of the perfectly informed and always rationally acting “homo oeconomicus”. As 
it turns out, this super hero however is mostly a mindless and lifeless construction. In 
order to remain consistent within the models we even have learned to portray entire 
social systems with the same technical terms as if these societies, groups, or families 
were equally homogenous social wholes in which the individual is only an abstraction. 
The impression that many economists follow Comte’s methodology and thus conjecture 
their world as a result of some great design but not as a “result of human action”30 can 
hardly be suppressed. Civilization, societies, culture, or languages however are neither 
the result of a planning mind nor of any super human ingenious plan: These social 
institutions evolve without any known purpose, direction or design31.  
 
In the natural sciences the particular properties of rocks, planets or molecules 
can be analyzed and their course of action can at least in principle be measured or 
predicted. The essence of human beings yet remains that people purposefully aim at the 
ends they have chosen. Human beings unpredictably can and will change their minds or 
attitudes, depending on circumstances far beyond their control. 
                                                 
30 See especially F.A. von Hayek “The results of human action but not of human design” in his Studies 
in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London, Routledge&Keagan Paul 1967. 
31 See Carl Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen 
Ökonomie insbesondere, Wien 1883, p. 208   18
This distinct Austrian approach has emerged slowly and gradually in an evolutionary 
process and is by no means restricted to economics rather it is applicable to all social 
sciences. It transcends economics and allows us to “understand” and 
“conceptualize”(begreifen) the formations of spontaneous social orders and is geared 
toward the interpretation of cultural facts 32. 
On the one hand side every change concerning the relevant knowledge of an 
individual will destroy the state of equilibrium that existed in all actions the individual 
has undertaken either prior or after the change of knowledge took place. An equilibrium 
will thus only exist in a period of time in which the so-called rational expectations 
prove to be correct. On the other hand the time factor become essential as any 
equilibrium needs to be defined as a relationship between at least two actions that 
necessarily take place one at a time. However, if the time factor is neglected in the 





It is assumed that because all human actions inherently carry the tendency 
towards a final state of equilibrium, that under certain conditions the intentions of 
individual market participants will always move towards an ever increasing higher 
degree of consent. In other words it is taken as known that the rational expectations of 
people will prove more accurate the more they move towards the equilibrium. This 
claim not only seems to make good common sense, but also to follow from empirical 
observations and thus ought to prove correct. However, this thesis neither is able to 
deliver the prove that there is such an intrinsic tendency towards an equilibrium, nor 
does it explain under what conditions and why the individuals involved in the 
transaction will change their decisions as soon as they acquire new information. The 
inherent equilibrium theory thus may only be accepted if the ever changing knowledge 
                                                 
32 This was already clearly seen by Carl Menger, in his Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre, Wien 
1871, p. 135-145.   19
that people gain through their transactions is taken into account. However, as it has 
been shown the entire equilibrium story is not much of a help to explain the reasons for 
changes were there even the lightest modifications of the data involved in the 
transaction. Mathematical economics thus is forced to turn a blind eye to all important 
institutions on which our social order and institutions rest, such as the law, morals, 
ethics, or the language. It seems as if the phantom of the “homo oeconomicus” which 
Carl Menger and his followers have so successfully started to drive out of the social 
sciences has returned in the form of mindless assumptions such as perfect competition, 
complete information, perfectly rational men, and a perfect market equilibrium.  
It is time to focus again on the fact that in economics we never study the state of 
an equilibrium but always processes.  